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Abstract: Firms organized as profit centers and the management practice of category management can
reflect a form of delegation we refer to as "partial delegation." For a bargaining problem between an
informed firm and an uninformed supplier, we show that a form of partial delegation by the informed
firm results in a first-best equilibrium quantity.  With partial delegation, the informed firm retains control
of how its private information is communicated.  This enables it to earn standard information rents
without creating quantity distortions.  Applications to spin-offs and vertical integration are discussed.4E.g. Baron and Besanko (1992, 1999), Melamud, Mookherjee, and Reichelstein (1992, 1995,
1997), Baliga and Sjoström (1998), Laffont and Martimort (1998), Severinov (1999), and Mookherjee
and Tsumagari (2001). 




Delegated authority is ubiquitous.  Examples range from democratic government to
representative bargaining to divisionalization in large corporations.  When a subordinate has superior
information, delegating decision-making authority can result in more efficient decisions but it also
introduces agency costs.  Much of the incentive-based literature on delegation seeks to identify
organizational and informational conditions under which this tradeoff supports delegation over
centralization.
4  In these cases, the focus is on what organizational form better serves an uninformed
principal.  
We seek instead to focus on the benefits of the commitment role of delegation to an informed
principal in a bargaining problem.  Consider the case of a firm with private valuation information
bargaining with a supplier over the price and quantity of a good.
5  If the firm and the supplier bargain
directly over the quantity to be transacted, the bargaining outcome may not yield a first best outcome (i.e.
a transaction that maximizes the sum of the surpluses of the two parties in each state of nature). One
well-known example leading to inefficient quantities occurs where the supplier can make a take-it-or-
leave-it offer of a non-linear price schedule to the firm.  The profit-maximizing price schedule for the
supplier in this case will induce transaction quantities that are below first-best levels because at lower
quantities the supplier pays the firm smaller information rents.
The question we examine in this paper is whether these direct bargaining inefficiencies can be
eliminated if the firm delegates the authority to negotiate with the supplier to an agent. We model the
agent as an independent profit center that contracts with the parent firm as well as the supplier.  The
delegation of decision-making thus creates a common agency game in which the firm and the supplier
each offer a non-linear contract to the agent.  
The delegation of decision-making to the agent can influence the interaction between the firm
and the supplier in two ways.  First, the firm can use its contract with the agent to eliminate the incentive
for the supplier to engage in rent extraction.  Specifically, by charging the agent more in high valuation
states, the firm can eliminate the rent extraction incentives of the supplier such that the resulting6Because one the effects of the transfer price is to restrict the set of profitable deals for the agent,
our model of partial delegation can be interpreted as combining elements of both "incentive delegation"
and "instructive delegation" as defined by Fershtman and Kalai (1997).
3
schedules induce first-best transaction levels.  Second,  if delegation allows the firm to move first in
offering a contract to the agent, it can commit the agent to bargain more aggressively with the supplier.
This benefit of delegation to the informed firm is similar to that analyzed by Schelling (1956) and
Fershtman and Judd (1987) in the context of full information games.  To identify the role of the first
effect independent of the second, we focus instead on two games in which the firm and the supplier offer
contracts simultaneously.  Both games have a continuum of equilibria, which we compare to the set of
incentive efficient equilibria of the initial no-delegation bargaining game.  Our interest is in whether the
delegation of authority to the agent can eliminate equilibria that do not have first-best quantities in
asymmetric information settings, and whether delegation can lead to a Pareto improvement over the
incentive efficient equilibria of the bargaining game.
We show that the answer to the first question depends critically on whether the agent is informed
of the firm’s private information.  In the first game we consider, referred to as the partial delegation
game, we assume that the agent does not know the firm’s true type.  In this case, the firm announces a
transfer price to the agent (which is also observable to the supplier).  Because the relationship between
the agent and the uninformed supplier is one of full information, equilibrium quantity distortions
disappear.
6  Yet, when one looks at the equilibrium transfers between the agent and the principals, it will
be apparent that the informed principal is still earning an information rent.  Thus, the partial delegation
game cannot lead to a Pareto improvement relative to the bargaining game between the firm and the
supplier.  However, it does pare down the set of equilibria from the bargaining game in a way that is
clearly beneficial to the firm when its direct bargaining power is low.  
The second game we consider is referred to as the full delegation game.  In it, the firm reveals its
private information to the agent.  As in the case of partial delegation, we assume that the firm and the
supplier simultaneously offer contracts to the agent.  The difference introduced by full delegation is that
the contract offered by the firm can depend on the firm’s true type while the contract offered by the
supplier can depend only on a type report from the agent.  We show that the full delegation game has a
large set of equilibria that includes all of the incentive efficient equilibria of the bargaining game. 
Equilibria with quantities that are not first best arise in the full delegation game because the supplier is
uncertain about the firm’s costs when it offers its schedule to the firm.   Thus, there will exist equilibria7See Blattberg and Fox (1995-6) for details on how category management is being implemented.
8See Hite and Owers (1983), Miles and Rosenfeld (1983), Schipper and Smith (1983), and
Rosenfeld (1984).
4
in which the supplier distorts the quantity schedule in order to extracts rents, and the schedule offered by
the firm anticipates this rent extraction by the supplier.  
We believe we see this form of delegation is two important commercial settings: corporations
organized as profit centers and category management.  Perhaps the best example of a corporation
organized along profit-center lines is the multinational corporation.  Often, a corporation doing business
in a foreign country sets up a wholly-owned subsidiary to handle its foreign transactions.  The subsidiary
operates as a separate economic unit but it also is required to conduct business, such as trade in
intermediate goods, with its parent on terms (i.e. transfer prices) usually set by the parent.  Much of the
literature on transfer pricing focuses on the tax benefits of this corporate structure.  Our work herein
suggests an efficiency benefit that may be more significant than a tax motive.  Since the same basic
incentives are also present in tax competition problems between two countries with a common
multinational, our work is certainly not incompatible with the literature on tax-induced transfer pricing.  
Our second example is the emerging management practice of category management.  Large
retailers like WalMart, purchase over 1500 different categories of products.  Category management
involves assigning a manager to each category.  The manager is responsible for negotiating with outside
suppliers and is compensated on the basis of her category's profits.  Part of the category's costs can
include costs for shelf space as well as overhead charges which are paid to the retailer.
7  Rather than
giving the category manager discretion over how to use information such as the opportunity cost of shelf
space, our results suggest that it is better for the retailer to maintain control of such information and
instead embed the appropriate rent-seeking incentives into the manager's contract in a non-distortionary
way. 
Finally, despite the admittedly simple information structure in our model, we believe our specific
results advance our understanding of two problems: corporate spin-offs and Bork's Thesis (1978).   The
finance literature has documented short-run excess stock price returns of 2.4% to 4.3% related to spin-off
announcements.
8  Numerous explanations for this phenomenon exist.  The one that is closest in spirit to
this paper is from Aron (1991).  She argues that with a multi-division firm, share price does not track the
performance of any one division very closely.  Spinning off a division allows owners to provide the
manager with stronger incentives based on stock price.  Seward and Walsh (1996), however, do not find9It is not essential that H(A) be independent of c.  If H
 (A,c) creates countervailing incentives
relative to v(A,c), the ability of the informed principal to mute or magnify rents, alluded to in the
introduction, could be compromised. 
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any evidence that the excess returns are related to stronger managerial incentives.  Our results suggest an
alternative explanation.  In the short run, the information of the parent about the spun-off division (e.g.
Ford and Visteon) remains accurate while the parent can now extract its surplus through an arm's-length
relationship.  Our analysis implies that by creating this arm's-length relationship, the parent eliminates
the incentives faced by suppliers that in equilibrium created quantity distortions.  This is inherently a
short-term advantage as over time the division's economic characteristics will likely change and its
reliance on its parent for business will diminish. 
Bork's Thesis is the term used by Prat and Rustichini (2002) to describe Judge Bork's argument
that vertical relationships, while viewed as anti-competitive, can facilitate efficient production.  Our work
extends the support for this argument found in Prat and Rustichini (2002) to an environment with private
information.  We find this application surprising in light of the conventional wisdom that private
information induces inefficiencies due to information rents.
In the next section, we set up a simple model of principal to principal bargaining.   Since our
results apply to more general bargaining weights than considered in Spulber (1988), this section is of
some independent interest. In Section 3, we then permit the informed principal to partially delegate
bargaining responsibilities to an agent and characterize the equilibria of the resulting common agency
game.  In Section 4, we analyze a game with fully delegated bargaining. We offer concluding comments
in Section 5.
2. A Model of Bargaining Between Two Principals.
Our model focuses on the strategic interaction between an informed principal and an uninformed
principal who are negotiating over the terms of transaction for q units of a product.  The informed
principal's benefit from the quantity transacted has two components.  The first is the “direct” benefit
V(q,c) from the transaction, which depends on a cost parameter, c.  This parameter represents the
informed principal's private information and is drawn from the distribution F(A) on  . The second
component is the “indirect” effect from the transaction, H(q).
9  The gross payoff to the uninformed
principal is denoted by -C(q).  
The primary example we use to motivate this payoff structure as well as use for expository
purposes throughout the paper is one in which the informed principal is a corporation whose production10This payoff structure is also consistent with our category management example where v is the
gross profit of the category and H is the spillover profits in related categories, and with our spin-off
example, again where v is the direct profit of the spin-off and H is the parent's spillover profit related to
its transactions with the spun off firm.
11Rochet's (1985) Taxation Principle implies that there is no loss in generality in restricting
attention to non-linear price contracts.  In this context, the Taxation Principle is equivalent to the
Revelation Principle.  We focus on non-linear contracts instead of direct contracts or mechanisms for
consistency with the analysis in the next section where it will be necessary to focus on non-linear
6
involves an internally produced intermediate good and an externally supplied product produced by the
uninformed principal.  In this case, V will be the corporation’s profit from the sale of its product net of
the cost of internally produced input and H is the corporation's profit from any spillovers to other
products.  The cost function of the external supplier is C(q).  The case to be considered in this section is
one of direct bargaining between the corporation and the supplier.  Our model of delegated negotiation,
to be considered in the next section, will introduce a subsidiary to the corporation.  The corporation will
still produce the internal intermediate good and provide it to the subsidiary.  The subsidiary will decide
how much of each intermediate good to purchase and will market the final product.  For simplicity we
assume that one unit of each intermediate good is needed to produce one unit of the final good.
10
Assumptions: The payoff functions have the following properties: 
a) V(q,c) = v(q) - cq
b) v(A) and H(A) are strictly increasing, strictly concave in q, and H(0)=v(0)=0.
c) C(A) is strictly increasing, strictly convex, and C(0)=0. 
Assumption (a) is adopted for convenience.  All of our results hold as long as V(A,A) satisfies the usual
single-crossing properties.  Letting   denote the total surplus from the
transaction, the first best quantity, q
F(c), is the solution to  .  Assumptions (b) and (c) ensure
that total surplus is strictly concave, so that the first best quantity is unique.  Assumption (a), and more
general versions, ensure that the first-best quantities and gross payoffs will be are decreasing in c.
We represent the outcome of direct bargaining by a non-linear price schedule T(q).  We refer to
T(q) as a contract.  It represents the transfer to be made by the corporation to the supplier.  The
corporation chooses the value of q to maximize profits, given T(q).
11  Total profit for the respectivecontracts.
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parties are 
 and  . (1)
Assuming that T(q) is differentiable, any strictly positive profit-maximizing quantity for the corporation,
q(c), will satisfy
 and  . (2)
The payoff generated by the corporation's optimal quantity choice is denoted  .





By integrating (3), corporation profit must equal
. (5)
In order for the corporation and the supplier to be willing to participate in the bargaining game, it
must yield a non-negative payoff to each party.  For the corporation, it follows from (3) that participation
is guaranteed for all values of the private information if  .   Similarly, participation by the
supplier yields a non-negative expected return if
.       (6)
Consistent with the approach used in Spulber (1988), we model the bargaining that takes place as
the outcome of some (interim) incentive efficient process.  Incentive efficiency, as defined by Holmström
and Myerson (1983), describes the set of quantity-money transfer allocations (q(c),T(q(c)) for which
there exists no other incentive compatible allocations (q
1(c),T
 1(q
1(c)) that yields higher expected profit
for the supplier or higher profit for any corporation type without giving the supplier or any other12The constraint '(q) $ 0 ensures that the average surplus created by exchange is sufficient to
cover the aggregate information rents earned by the corporation.
8
corporation type lower profit.  Myerson (1985) and Wilson (1985) show that this incentive constrained
Pareto frontier can be described by maximizing the weighted welfare function 
(7)
subject to the incentive compatibility constraints, (3) and (4), and the participation constraints, (6) and
.   The non-negative weights, "(A) and (, are normalized so that 
. (8)
Intuitively, these weights proxy the parties' relative bargaining power.  In describing the incentive
constrained Pareto frontier, define 
(9)
which is the expected weight placed on corporation profit for all types less than c.  This conditional
weight is important because incentive compatibility requires that if type c earns an extra dollar, all lower
types must also earn an extra dollar.  The conditional weight measures the cumulative effect of such a
transfer.
Using (1), (7) can be rewritten as  
. (10)
Given (3), the proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix shows that (6) is equivalent to
. (11)
Thus, for a given set of weights, we define the equilibrium bargaining allocation by the quantity
schedule, q(c), and minimum corporation profit,  , that maximizes (10) subject to (3), (4), (11),
, and '(q) $ 0.
12  Denote the incentive efficient quantity schedule as q
B(A) and the corresponding13When the solutions that follow imply q)(A) > 0 for some c, an "ironing" procedure implies that
the incentive efficient quantity schedule is constant on some open sets of c.  We do not address these




B(c). We will focus on welfare weights for which q
B(A) is strictly decreasing.
13  
The solution will depend on the relative aggregate welfare weights,   and (.  When  ,
the key welfare trade-off balances the direct welfare losses from trading an inefficient quantity with the
cost to the supplier of paying the corporation an information rent that is increasing in q.  If 8 denotes the
multiplier on '(q), the incentive efficient quantity exchanged is defined by 
. (12)
In addition, when  ,  .  
When  , the key trade-off balances the direct welfare losses from trading an inefficient
quantity with the cost of distributing the information rents among different types of the corporation. Now
the incentive efficient quantity exchanged is defined by 
(13)
and   is set at its maximal level as defined by (11).
Proposition 1a.  Assume the welfare weights imply  .  Then the incentive efficient allocation is
fully separating (i.e. (q
B))(A) < 0) and satisfies (12) if, and only if,  
(14)
where 8* is the multiplier associated with '(q) $ 0.  Moreover,   if   and
 if  .
Proposition 1b.  Assume the welfare weights imply  .  Then the incentive efficient allocation is10
fully separating (i.e. (q
B))(A) < 0) and satisfies (13) if, and only if,
   (15)
where 8** is the multiplier associated with '(q) $ 0.  Moreover,  .
In principal agent models that endow the uninformed principal with all the bargaining power, i.e.
(=1, the usual increasing inverse hazard rate assumption, (F/f )) > 0, is sufficient for conditions (14) and
(15) to hold.  With distributed bargaining power, extreme welfare weights can imply pooling in the
quantity schedule.  For instance, (14) is equivalent to 
. (16)
Thus, the characterizations in Propositions 1a and 1b only apply if "(A) is sufficiently uniform.
Several examples help illustrate important features of the incentive efficient quantity schedules. 
The first example concerns the possibility of a bargaining equilibrium which generates the first best
quantity schedule, q
F(c).  
Example 1:  By setting "(c) = (= .5, the necessary conditions in (12) yield q
B(A) = q
F(A) for sufficiently
large total welfare that  8
* = 0.  To verify that '(q
F) $ 0, note that   from (5)
and the definition of the first best quantities.  It then follows that  , so q
F(A) will be a
solution to (12) in this case as long as     Combining this observation with Proposition 1a
yields the following result:  
Corollary 2: There is a class of incentive efficient equilibria in which q
B(A) = q
F(A).  For these equilibria,
the payoffs to the players are   and  ,  where
. 
In addition to the first best quantity schedule, it is also possible to generate incentive efficient
quantity schedules which have outputs that may exceed or fall short of the first best quantities.  The
following examples illustrate the variety of possible outcomes.
Example 2.  Assume "(c) / 0 and ( = 1.  This is the standard principal-agent formulation.  With an
increasing inverse hazard rate, q
B(A) solves Wq = F/f .  In this case the supplier distorts the quantity11
schedule downward in order to reduce the size of information rents earned by the corporation.  As a
result, the corporation's payoff will be strictly less than in any of the equilibria associated with the first
best quantities for  .   
Example 3. Assume "(c) = .75 - .7c for c 0 [0,1] and assume F(c) = c.  Thus, ( = .6 and
 so Proposition 1a applies.  Figure 1 illustrates q
B(A) and q
F(A).  Note that q
B(c) < q
F(c)
only when c > 3/7.  Unlike typical incomplete information problems, the optimal quantity can be
inefficiently high.  The reason for this can best be understood in the context of the next example.
Example 4. Assume "(c) = .75 - .4c for c 0 [0,1] and assume F(c) = c.  Thus, ( = .45,  ,
and Proposition 1b applies.  Figure 2 shows that q
B(c) $ q
F(c) for all c.  Moreover, both the lowest and
highest types trade a first-best quantity.  On average, gains to the corporation are valued more than gains
to the supplier.  This suggests that, again on average, all the surplus should accrue to the corporation. 
Since, corporation profits are weighted differentially, the incentive exists for intermediate types to trade a
higher quantity.  Exceeding the first-best level increases profits for lower types at the expense of higher
types.  As (11) reveals the unweighted benefit is -Wc A F or q A F.  For all but the lowest type, the marginal
welfare benefit of trading more than the first-best level,  , is offset by the marginal cost of overall
surplus reduction realized by all types,  , due to trading a second-best quantity.  For the lowest and
highest possible type, these marginal welfare effects exactly offset, implying a first-best quantity.  From
(14) it is clear that key to generating this excess quantity distortion is a decreasing welfare weight
function as it implies that the benefits of the increased trade should accrue to higher welfare types.  The
last example will show that one can also generate inefficiently low trade quantities even when  .
Figure 1 Figure 214Martimort and Stole (1997) show that in this common agency setting, non-linear price
competition induces no loss of generality while direct mechanism competition does.  That is, restricting
attention to competition in direct mechanisms is not the appropriate way to apply the Revelation
12
Example 5.  Assume "(c) = 1.4c for c 0 [0,1]and assume F(c) = c.  Thus, ( = .3 and   so
Proposition 1b still applies.  Unlike Example 4, gains to higher types are now weighted more than gains




Consider now an alternative game in which the corporation delegates the responsibility for
choosing its output level to a wholly-owned subsidiary.  Subsidiary payoffs and choices will be denoted
by a because the subsidiary is a formal agent of the corporation and informal agent (arising through any
contract incentives) of the supplier. In this section, we consider a partial delegation scenario in which the
corporation makes a type report to the subsidiary that is public.  We use the term "partial delegation"
because the corporation delegates the responsibility for deciding how much to purchase to its subsidiary
but retains control of how information is released to the supplier.
Decisions are made in the context of a two-stage game.  In the first stage, the corporation
announces a cost report 6 and a contract T
 c(q,6) and the supplier simultaneously announces a contract 
T
 s(q,6).  By assuming the contracts are offered simultaneously, we eliminate the bias towards delegation
that might be due to a first-mover advantage. In the second stage, the subsidiary chooses q.  Since
technically, our game is one of common agency it is now necessary that we consider competition in non-
linear contracts.
14  We will focus on equilibria of this game for which the contracts are differentiable andPrinciple in common agency games and thus invalidates any normative analysis.  On the other hand,
because the agent has quasi-linear preferences, one can restrict attention to competition in non-linear
contracts and not miss any allocations that could be generated by the equilibrium of some more
complicated Nash game between the principals.
15When both principals are informed, this differentiability condition will imply that q(c) = q
F(c)
in any Nash equilibrium with an interior solution for the agent’s action.  However, interior solutions that
are not first best could arise if schedules are not differentiable.  Our assumption thus rules out this source
of multiplicity of equilibria from the full information game.
13
we will refer to these equilibria as "differentiable partial delegation" equilibria.
15  
One can interpret T
 c(q,6) as the "dividend" paid to the corporation and 6 as the transfer price for
the intermediate good produced by the corporation.  As a distinct economic unit, the subsidiary earns
profit of 
. (17)
If 6 is zero, then the subsidiary is only concerned with its revenues and ignores the cost of the
intermediate good, except as it is may be reflected in T
 c(A,0).  If 6 equals c, then the subsidiary is directly
responsible for the minimum cost of the intermediate good and any excess costs would have to be
reflected in T
 c(A,c).  Alternatively, if 6 equals  , the subsidiary is directly responsible for the maximal
cost of the intermediate good and T
 c(A, ) can specify any "rebates" available to the subsidiary.  Notice
that the corporation's contract depends on q and 6 but not on c as a contract that depends on private
information is not verifiable and hence not enforceable.  Corporation profit is also affected by this form
of delegation.  Now
. (18)
The term (6 - c)q represents the corporation's transfer price derived profit.  The definition of supplier
profit remains the same as in (1). The "p" superscript is used to help remind us that we are dealing with
partial delegation.
We begin by analyzing the second stage problem, where the subsidiary chooses its optimal
output given the contracts offered by the supplier and the corporation.  Assuming differentiable contracts,
any strictly profit maximizing quantity chosen by the subsidiary will satisfy
. (19)16All common agency games have zero activity equilibria in which both principals offer contracts
that charge exorbitant prices and the agent chooses to buy nothing.  Our analysis will focus on positive
activity equilibria. 
14
We denote strictly positive solutions to (19) as q
 a(6).
16 
We now turn to the choice of the contracts to be offered by the principals.  First consider the case
of the supplier, who selects a contract,  , that can depend on both the quantity selected by the
agent and the cost parameter that is reported to the subsidiary by the corporation.  Although the supplier
does not know the true cost, c, this is still a full information problem because the supplier knows the
transfer price that is being used by the subsidiary to make decisions.  Since 6 is known, the supplier will 
choose   to drive the subsidiary to zero profit.  Using this fact in (17), the supplier’s optimization
problem can be expressed as choosing q to maximize 
(20)
The supplier’s best response,  , can then be chosen to induce the selection of the preferred
quantity, using (11), and zero profits for the subsidiary.  The preferred quantity satisfies
.  Combining these necessary conditions with (19), it follows that the
supplier's contract must satisfy 
. (21)
The supplier’s non-linear price schedule has the “local truthfulness” property (in the sense of Bernheim
and Whinston (1986)), because the marginal transfer required from the subsidiary at the optimal choice
will reflect the marginal cost of an increment in quantity to the supplier.   
The parent corporation will choose 6 and   to maximize the payoff in (18).  Since the
corporation’s schedule can be chosen to drive the subsidiary to zero profit, given  , its payoff can
be expressed as 
(22)
The corporation will choose q and 6 to maximize (22).  The necessary condition for the corporation's
preferred quantity is  .  Combining this with (19), the corporation’s non-
linear schedule must satisfy
. (23)15
in order to induce the preferred choice of quantity by the subsidiary.  As in the case of the supplier, the
corporation’s non-linear schedule will be locally truthful because it reflects the marginal cost of output to
the corporation (when evaluated at the chosen 6).  The necessary condition for choice of 6 requires that
 at an interior solution.  The transfer price is used by the corporation to minimize the
transfer that must be paid to the supplier, because the transfer price does not play a critical role in
determining the output level.  This happens because the corporation can influence the subsidiary’s choice
of output through both 6 and  .  Any change in these parameters that keeps their sum constant
will leave subsidiary output unaffected. 
The profits of the corporation in the best response will be 
(24)
which must satisfy   in order for the type c corporation to participate.  Using the envelope
theorem, this yields 
(25)
where 6(c) is the corporation’s choice of transfer price.  The participation constraint then simplifies to 
.   If a quantity schedule q
 p(c) represents an equilibrium to the partial delegation game, it will
generate information rents for the corporation that are governed by (25).  Note that these information
rents are governed by the same incentive compatibility condition as in the bargaining game in (5).  
We can now use the results from the best response functions of the respective players to
characterize the quantity schedules that are equilibria in the partial delegation game.  In order for a
schedule q 
p(c) to be an equilibrium, it must satisfy  , where 6
*(c) is the equilibrium
transfer price schedule chosen by the corporation.  Substituting (21) and (23) into (19) yields the
requirement that  , so that the only quantity schedule that satisfies the necessary
conditions for the partial delegation equilibrium is the first best quantity schedule,  .  
In order to establish that the first best quantity schedule is an equilibrium to this game, we must
construct non-linear contracts that satisfy the corporation’s and the supplier’s best response functions. 
Suppose we consider the following contracts: 
   and       . (26)
It is straightforward to verify that with these contracts, 6(c) = c will be a (weak) best response for the17 Although there will be a unique equilibrium quantity schedule q
 p(c) = q
F(c), the equilibrium
mapping 6
*(c) is not unique.  For example, let  , where b(6) is a
strictly monotone function mapping  onto itself.  In this case,   would be a best
response for the corporation and would result in a first best choice of quantities by the subsidiary.  Since
the subsidiary profit in (17) does not depend on c, only strictly monotonic 6
*(A) can arise in equilibrium.
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corporation, and this will yield q
a(c) = q
F(c) as the best response for the subsidiary.
17  Since the best
responses must drive the subsidiary to zero profits, the parameters in the contracts in (26) must satisfy
.  In addition, the participation constraints require that N
s, N
c(6) $ 0.  These
conditions yield the requirement that   and  .  It then follows
from (25) that  .
Proposition 3.  There exist a continuum of (positive production) differentiable partial delegation
equilibria.  They all induce first-best equilibrium quantities.  These equilibria generate payoffs to the
corporation of   where  and to the supplier of
.
Note that the equilibria in the partial delegation game generate payoffs that are equivalent to
those in the solutions to the bargaining problem that yield first best quantities, as identified in the
Corollary 2.  The participation constraint for the supplier in the partial delegation case requires that
 for all c.  This condition is more stringent than the participation constraint for the
bargaining game, which only requires this condition to hold in expected value terms.  However, the more
stringent participation condition does not constrain the payoffs that can be achieved with the first best
quantities because (25) requires that the corporation capture any surplus generated by lower values of c. 
Thus, the payoff to the supplier must be independent of the realization of c with first best quantities.  
Partial delegation cannot yield a Pareto improvement over direct bargaining, because the
equilibria to the partial delegation game are a proper subset of the set of incentive efficient equilibria
identified in Proposition 1.  However, the corporation might choose partial delegation if it results in an
outcome with a higher payoff than under direct bargaining.
Corollary 4. If   and (14) is satisfied, then the corporation prefers partial delegation to direct18It turns out that in equilibrium the corporation will not have an incentive to misrepresent its
information to the subsidiary. 
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bargaining.
Proof. Corporation profit under direct bargaining equals   where   for all  . 
The lowest possible equilibrium payoff under partial delegation equals  . Q.E.D.
One example satisfying the conditions of Corollary 4 arises if under direct bargaining the supplier can
make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the corporation, as in the principal-agent formulation (Example 2
above).  Delegation benefits the corporation in this case by preventing the supplier from distorting the
quantity schedule to engage in rent extraction.  This suggests that partial delegation should be attractive
in situations where the corporation has low bargaining power in the bargaining game.  Note that this
benefit of delegation will hold even if the bargaining power of the subsidiary is lower than that of the
corporation, because even the worst partial delegation equilibrium payoff of the corporation is higher
than the corporation's direct bargaining payoff.  
A second way in which partial delegation could be more attractive is if the structure of the game
gives the corporation more bargaining power in the selection of the equilibrium.  For example, suppose
that in the partial delegation game the corporation is able to move first and commit to the schedule it
offers to the subsidiary.  This would allow the corporation to earn the maximum profit by setting 
, which would leave the supplier with zero surplus.  This effect is in the spirit of
Fershtmann and Judd (1987) because delegation allows the corporation to commit to a more aggressive
play in interactions with the supplier.  
4. Full Delegation.
To emphasize the importance of separating the output decisions from the information reporting,
we now consider a two-stage game in which the corporation delegates both responsibilities to the
subsidiary.  We are assuming that the corporation truthfully reveals its private information to its
subsidiary, but not to the supplier, so that the subsidiary knows the true value of c when it makes its
output decision.
18 We maintain the same order of moves as in the partial delegation case.  However, the
difference in informational assumptions will change the form of the contracts that are offered by the
corporation and the supplier.  
In the first stage, the corporation and the supplier simultaneously offer non-linear contracts 
T
 c(q,c) and T
s(q) that specify transfers to be made from the subsidiary to the corporation and the supplier18
as a function of the subsidiary’s choice of q.  The corporation’s contract can be conditioned on the
realization of c because it knows the value at the time of contracting.  Since there is not a public report of
the supplier’s marginal cost in this case, the contract offered by the supplier can depend only on the
quantity.  As in the previous section, the analysis is limited to the case in which the contracts are
differentiable.  In the second stage, the subsidiary chooses q to maximize
(27)
and makes the required transfers.  We will use an "f" superscript, as above, to denote profits in this full
delegation setting.  We will refer to equilibria as "full delegation" equilibria.
Our main result in this section is to show that the full delegation game has a continuum of
equilibria that include the incentive efficient equilibria identified in Proposition 1.  In addition, we show
that there are other inefficient equilibria to the full delegation game.  In the full delegation game, the
supplier does not know the true cost of the corporation and thus has an incentive to engage in rent
extraction from the subsidiary.  As a result, we obtain equilibria with quantity schedules that are not first
best.  This contrasts with the case of partial delegation, where the public report of the transfer cost
created a full information problem for the supplier and eliminated the rent extraction incentive.  
Given the differentiable contracts chosen by the corporation and the supplier, the subsidiary’s
choice of q at an interior solution will satisfy
 and  .
Let   and let  . Analogous to (3) and (4), q 
f(c) must satisfy
. (28)
Due to (28), the corporation's contract affects the subsidiary's incentive compatibility conditions in two
ways.  The first is through the relationship between the subsidiary's type and its net return.  For instance,
low cost types must earn lower profits than high cost types if the corporation chooses to extract
significantly more rents from low cost types (i.e.,  ).  The second
effect is through the marginal valuation of q.  If  , then a low cost subsidiary places a higher
marginal valuation on q and   is required for implementation.  However, if   the
schedule must be non-decreasing in c.
In the first stage, corporation profit equals 
(29)
where the second equality follows by substitution using (27).  Thus, the corporation’s problem is to
design T 
c(q,c) so that the subsidiary chooses the value of q that maximizes (29) subject to the constraint19
that a
 f(q,c) $ 0.  The corporation's optimal choice of q will satisfy   and
, with T 
c(A,c) chosen such that A
 (c) = 0.  Note that, from the second order
conditions, the corporation's optimal quantity schedule will satisfy  .  Combining the
corporation's and the subsidiary's necessary conditions implies  .  Consistent with
this requirement, let q
*(A) > 0 denote the corporation's desired output schedule.  We will investigate the
existence of equilibria that generate q
*(A) and in which the contract of the corporation takes the form 
    . (30)
The contract in (30) has three immediate implications.  First,  .  Second, since
, the subsidiary's second-order incentive compatibility condition implies q
*)(c) # 0.  Third, using
(18) and the fact that subsidiary profit is zero with any corporation best response to T
 s(A), (30) implies
.
Since the supplier does not know the corporation/subsidiary's type, the supplier chooses a
contract T 
s(q) to maximize  .  Using (27) and (30), the supplier's optimization
problem can be expressed as the choice of a quantity schedule to maximize the difference between social
surplus and the aggregate rents earned by the subsidiary and the corporation, subject to the incentive
compatibility conditions in (28).  
  (31)
If we denote a solution to (31) by  , then the supplier's best response will be the contract that induces
the subsidiary to choose  .  Since   is monotonic by (31c), the Taxation Principle allows us to write
the supplier's best response to T
 c(q,c) as 
(32)
where the last two terms come from integrating constraint (31a).   In equilibrium,   must equal q
*(c).19Solutions to (33) are robust to any changes in the definition of the corporation's direct and
indirect benefits that do not change v(q,c) + H
 (q) for all q.
20
Proposition 5. Let q




*(c) is a non-decreasing function such that 0 # $
*(c) # 1.  For any 
(34)
there will be a Nash equilibrium in non-linear contracts in which the payoff to a type c corporation from
its subsidiary will be 
. (35)
The equilibrium schedules   are obtained by substituting (35) into (30) and by substituting
q*(c) for   in (32).  
Proposition 5 provides a partial characterization of equilibria because we have restricted
attention to non-linear corporation contracts of the form specified in (20).  Corollary 6 shows that this set
of equilibria is large enough to make important comparisons with Proposition 1.
Corollary 6.  All fully separating incentive efficient bargaining allocations are delegation equilibrium
allocations.
Proof.  For those allocations defined by Proposition 1a, (12) implies  .  For
those allocations defined by Proposition 1b, (13) implies  .  Simple
inspection of both cases reveals that $
*(A) is non-negative, non-decreasing, and always less than or equal
to one. Q.E.D.
A few examples illustrate that the delegation game with this class of schedules can result in a
range of quantity schedules including the first-best.  20Standard hazard rate conditions on F(A) exist that ensure q
*(A) is strictly decreasing in these
examples as well as examples in which only an interior type produces a first-best quantity. 
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Example 6. Define $
*(c) = ((1-()/()AF(c).  The solution defined by (33) corresponds to the incentive
efficient allocation from Proposition 1a associated with "(c) / " = 1- ( # ½ . 
Example 7. Define $
*(c) = x 0 [0,1].  If we choose x = 0, then (33) implies   and
.  This is the same quantity schedule as in Proposition 1a when (=1.  In
contrast, if we choose x = 1, then   and  .
20  This quantity
schedule cannot be incentive efficient as it corresponds to   which in turn requires "(A) / 0. 
From the first part of this example, "(A) / 0 generates a very different incentive efficient quantity
schedule.
Example 8. Define $
*(c) = F(c). In this case, (33a) yields the first-best quantity schedule, q
 F(c).
Example 7 is significant because it establishes the existence of incentive inefficient equilibria. 
Together Corollary 6 and Example 7 also illustrates the role of commitment.  By setting
, the corporation imposes a strong individual rationality constraint on the subsidiary, a
constraint the supplier must respect.  Constraint (31a) now requires that  .  If for
some value of c
*, A(c
*)=0, then (31a) and (31b) imply that, for c close to but below c
*, only schedules
with q(c) $ q
F(c) are feasible as lower quantities would imply negative subsidiary profit for those lower
types. 
Note that the benefits of delegation to the corporation will depend upon which equilibrium the
principals coordinate.  The structure of the contracts in (30) and (32) show that part of this coordination
involves implicit agreement on the corporation's equilibrium rent.  This was not the case under partial
delegation as all differentiable equilibria induce first-best output.  If full delegation does not change the
corporation's bargaining power, then only changes in the timing of moves, (e.g. a Stackelberg game))
would enable the corporation to guarantee high equilibrium payoffs relative to direct bargaining.  
Finally, Laffont and Martimort (1998) point out that collusion between the subsidiary and the supplier
might undermine the corporation's effort to increase its rents.  This possibility is absent in our partial
delegation game.  However, even in our full delegation game this is not an issue.  Any rents the
subsidiary might earn from a side contract with the supplier cannot be retained in equilibrium because the
corporation has full information.  To be effective, incentive compatibility of the side-contract would
require the supplier to pay the subsidiary information rents that the corporation cannot anticipate in21The way in which Laffont and Martimort (1998) introduce communication limits does not have
any effect in our model.  Thus, our argument is equivalent to their Theorem 1 asserting no equilibrium
loss from side-contracting.
22In an earlier version of this paper, we considered a partial equilibrium game in which the
corporation and the supplier first simultaneously announce their contracts and then the corporation
reports c to its subsidiary and 6 to the supplier.  In addition, we assumed that c 0 {L,H} with L < H.  The
key property that persists with a continuum of possible type values is that the equilibrium quantity will be
distorted away from the first-best level.  Because the subsidiary's profit depends on c (as well as 6), the
supplier must pay the subsidiary an information rent.  Even though this rent will be appropriated by the
corporation, it will nonetheless introduce a quantity distortion.





As an alternative to recent papers that focus on the potential for delegation to mitigate the impact
of collusion among privately-informed agents, this paper considers the potential for delegation by an
informed party in influencing bargaining outcomes.  We believe our paper offers three new results.  First,
our characterization of the set of incentive efficient direct bargaining allocations extends the work of
Spulber (1988).  Our results cover a larger set of welfare weights and identify allocations that can involve
over production as well as the standard underproduction.  Second, our analysis of our full delegation
game extends the work of Fershtman and Kalai (1997) to incorporate the effects of private information.
We show that the commitment effect induced by the introduction of a delegate, allows an informed
principal to induce favorable rent shifting.  Third, our partial delegation game identifies what we believe
is a new and intriguing property of delegation: partial delegation creates the opportunity for an informed
principal to earn information rents without creating a quantity distortion.
22
Our paper suggests a number of extensions.  The literature on category management certainly
suggests the need to include a moral hazard component to the agent's utility as well as private supplier
information.  Also, in our full delegation game, renegotiation between the corporation and the subsidiary
after information is shared may give the corporation an incentive to strategically manage what it tells its
subsidiary.  Once the subsidiary learns the corporation's private information, it may have an incentive to
use that information to bargain for positive surplus.
23  Obviously, one way to respond to this possibility is
by only partially delegating.  However, we do not at this time rule out alternative responses to agent23
renegotiation in a full delegation setting as there may be important economic settings in which partial
delegation is not feasible.  We hope to address these and other extensions in future work. 24
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Appendix
Proof of Propositions 1a and 1b: Our proof consists of three steps. First, substituting (3) into (10) yields
. (A.1)
Second, constraint (6) is equivalent to 
. (A.2)




(A.2) is equivalent to 
. (A.4)
Since  , we must also ensure that 
. (A.5)
As a result, incentive efficient bargaining allocations can be derived by choosing q(A) and   to
maximize (A.1) subject to (A.4),  , (A.5), and q)(A) # 0.  
As is common in the literature, the third step in the proof is to solve the optimization problem
without the last constraint and then verify that it is satisfied.  From this point on, we will also use
Assumption (a) and replace   with -q(c).
Case 1:  .  Given this assumption,   when   and 
 when  . In either case, the Lagrangian is27
(A.6)
where 8 $ 0 is the multiplier associated with (A.5).  It is strictly concave in q(A).  Define the quantity
schedule q





* to be the smallest value of 8 $ 0 such that (A.5) is satisfied by q
*(A,8).  Because the integrand in
(A.5) is continuous in q(A), 8
* is well-defined. If Mq
*(c,8
*)/Mc # 0, then q
B(A) =  q
*(A,8
*) is the incentive
efficient quantity schedule.  Since W(q,c) is strictly concave, totally differentiating (A.7) implies
Mq
*(c,8
*)/Mc # 0 if, and only if,
. (A.8)




Again,  is strictly concave in q(A).  Define q
**(A,8) from the first-order condition with respect to q(A) from
(A.10).  Thus, q
**(A,8) is the solution to
. (A.11)
Define 8
** to be the smallest value of 8 $ 0 such that (A.5) is satisfied by q





**)/Mc # 0, then q
B(A) = q
**(A,8
**) is the incentive efficient quantity schedule for this
case.  Totally differentiating (A.11) shows that Mq
**(c,8
**)/Mc # 0 if, and only if, 
. (A.12)
Q.E.D.28
Proof of Proposition 5:  In contrast to the standard principal agent problem in which (31b) binds only for
the least cost type, the solution to the corporation's problem dictates that in equilibrium A(c) will equal
zero for all c and thus can bind on open sets of types.  Therefore, we formulate the supplier's problem as
an optimal control problem with a pure state constraint.  Following Seierstad and Sydsaeter, we form the
Hamiltonian
and the associated Lagrangian
.
Theorem 5.1 in  Seierstad and Sydsaeter shows that (q
*(c), A(c) = 0) will maximize (31) if there exists a
piecewise continuous function 8(c) $ 0 and a continuous and piecewise continuously differentiable
function :(c) satisfying the following conditions:   ,  , and
. Condition (a) establishes that the quantities will depart from the first best if
:(c)  0.  This will occur if it is optimal for the supplier to distort the quantity schedule in order to reduce
the information rents it must pay the subsidiary.
Consider a candidate equilibrium quantity schedule q
*(c) and corporation payoff schedule
, which can be substituted into (30) and (32) to yield candidate contracts   and  . 
These contracts define an equilibrium if (i) q
*(c) solves (27) given   and  , (ii) A(c) = 0 for
all c, (iii) q
*(c) solves (29) subject to  , for all c, and given  , and (iv) q
*(c) solves (31)
given  .  
For q
*(c) strictly decreasing and differentiable, all four conditions are satisfied.  (i): Given
 and  ,   implies that a
 f(q,c) is concave in q and maximized at q
*(c).
(ii) and (iii): Straightforward calculations show that   implies A
 f(c)/0 and 
q
*(c) 0 argmaxq B
 f(q,c) s.t. A
  f(c) $ 0.  (iv): Define  .  Since 8(t) $0, $
*(A) is
non-decreasing. Using condition (b) from above, this definition also implies that  .
Without loss of generality, we can set k = 0.  Condition (c) from above will then be satisfied as long as 
0 # $
*(c)# 1. Appealing to Seierstad and Sydsæter (1987, Chapter 5, Theorem 3), any such function $
*(A)
yields a solution to (33), q
*(c), that solves (31).  Condition (34) guarantees that S
 f $ 0. Q.E.D.